This popular and classic text chronicles America's roller-coaster journey through the decades since World War II. Considering both the paradoxes and the possibilities of postwar America, William H. Chafe portrays the significant cultural and political themes that have colored our country's past and present, including issues of race, class, gender, foreign policy, and economic and social reform. He examines such subjects as the Vietnam War, the civil rights movement, the origins and the end of the Cold War, the culture (...) of the 1970s, the rise of the New Right, the events of September 11th and their aftermath, and various presidencies.Now thoroughly revised and updated, the seventh edition of The Unfinished Journey combines and reorganizes several chapters. The former Chapter 14, "New Rules, Old Realities," is now divided into two chapters. The new Chapter 14, "An Era of Political Malaise," covers the political history of the 1970s. It is followed by Chapter 15, "A Divided Culture, A Divided Society," which assesses the shifting cultural landscape of the 1970s and the emergence of major fissures in the social system of the nation. The final chapter contains substantial new material on the administration of George W. Bush, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the election of 2008, and the first year of Barack Obama's presidency. Brilliantly written by a prize-winning historian, The Unfinished Journey, Seventh Edition, is an essential text for all students of recent American history. (shrink)

In the first section, I consider what several logicians say informally about the notion of logical consequence. There is significant variation among these accounts, they are sometimes poorly explained, and some of them are clearly at odds with the usual technical definition. In the second section, I first argue that a certain kind of informal account—one that includes elements of necessity, generality, and apriority—is approximately correct. Next I refine this account and consider several important questions about it, including the appropriate (...) characterization of necessity, the criterion for selecting logical constants, and the exact role of apriority. I argue, among other things, that there is no need to recognize a special logical sense of necessity and that the selection of terms to serve as logical constants is ultimately a pragmatic matter. In the third section, I consider whether the informal account I have presented and defended is adequately represented by the usual technical definition. I show that it is, and provably so, for certain limited ways of selecting logical constants. In the general case, however, there seems to be no way to be sure that the technical and informal accounts coincide. (shrink)

We note in Section I that an acceptable formulation of Presentism must preserve its consistency with Transient Time and inconsistency with Static Time. After arguing in Section II that certain formulations of Presentism are unacceptable, we offer in Section III a formulation of Presentism that we defend against the charge of triviality.

This volume offers an unusual variety of topics presented during the sixth annual Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy.

The year Leo Strauss published "Persecution and the Art of Writing" (1941), he prepared a lecture ("German Nihilism") that he never published. An analysis of this lecture shows that Strauss hadn't fully mastered the art of writing he'd discovered in others: his secrets are too exposed. In the context of "German Nihilism," it becomes clear that "Persecution and the Art of Writing" is about liberal persecution of authoritarianism, no the reverse, as liberals would assume. In response to recent apologias presenting (...) Strauss as a liberal who didn't "write between the lines," a Strauss-style reading of "German Nihilism" disproves both claims. (shrink)

Investigates the rapid evolution of the ape brain into the hominid brain, and explains why understanding our evolutionary past can help us survive an uncertain future.

Although the use of possible worlds in semantics has been very fruitful and is now widely accepted, there is a puzzle about the standard definition of validity in possible-worlds semantics that has received little notice and virtually no comment. A sentence of an intensional language is typically said to be valid just in case it is true at every world under every model on every model structure of the language. Each model structure contains a set of possible worlds, and models (...) are defined relative to model structures, assigning truth-values to sentences at each world countenanced by the model structure. The puzzle is why more than one model structure is used in the definition of validity. There is presumably just one class of all possible worlds and just one model structure defined on this class that does correctly the things that model structures are supposed to do. (These include, but need not be limited to, specifying the set of individuals in each world as well as various accessibility relations between worlds.) Why not define validity simply as truth at every world under every model on this one model structure? What is the point of bringing in more model structures than just this one?

We investigate these questions in some detail and conclude that for many intensional languages the puzzle points to a genuine difficulty: the standard definition of validity is insufficiently motivated. We begin (Section 1) by showing that a plausible and natural account of validity for intensional languages can be based on a single model structure, and that validity so defined is analogous in important respects to the standard account of validity for extensional languages. We call this notion of validity "validity!", and in Section 2 we contrast it with the standard notion, which we call "validity2". Several attempts are made to discover a rationale for the almost universal acceptance of validity2, but in most of these attempts we come up empty-handed. So in Section 3 we investigate validity! for some intensional languages. Our investigation includes providing axiomatizations for several propositional and predicate logics, most of which are provably complete. The completeness proofs are given in the Appendix, which also contains a sketch of a compactness proof for one of the predicate logics. (shrink)

An expanded version has now appeared: HOW BRAINS THINK: Evolving Intelligence, Then and Now in the Science Masters series (BasicBooks 1996 in the USA and Weidenfeld & Nicolson in the UK, various translation editions elsewhere, including China). My Darwin Machines model for cerebral cortical circuitry has now appeared as THE CEREBRAL CODE: Thinking a Thought in the Mosaics of the Mind (MIT Press 1996).

This paper takes a critical look at theory-free, statistical methodologies for processing and interpreting data taken from respondents answering a set of dichotomous (yes-no) questions. The basic issue concerns to what extent theoretical conclusions based on such analyses are invariant under a class of "informationally equivalent" question transformations. First the notion of Boolean equivalence of two question sets is discussed. Then Lazarsfeld's latent structure analysis is considered in detail. It is discovered that the best fitting latent model depends on which (...) one of the many informationally equivalent question sets is used. This fact raises a number of methodological problems and pitfalls with latent structure analysis. Related problems with other methodologies are briefly discussed. (shrink)

This book argues that Cicero deserves to be spoken of with more respect and to be studied with greater care. Using Plato’s influence on Cicero’s life and writings as a clue, Altman reveals the ineffable combination of qualities—courage, originality, intelligence, sparkling wit, subtlety, deep respect for his teacher, and deadly seriousness of purpose—that enabled Cicero not only to revive Platonism, but also to rival Plato himself.

Modern technology presents new challenges and possibilities to the environment and life on earth. It is argued that ecology as the science of the earth as a whole cannot provide the means for making technical decisions pertaining to the environment. An alternative means is suggested in which modern technology provides the medium for communicating with nature, so that a dialogue, an intruding in and listening to nature, becomes the basis both for seeing modern technology in a new light and for (...) living with modern technology in a new way. Some theological ramifications are also explored. (shrink)

Space is infinitely interesting! Space has both scientific and cultural currency because it has captured the imagination of human beings from ancient times until today. What seemed like science fiction centuries and only decades ago, is now science fact. Technological developments present and on the cusp are putting more and more of space into our hands. That is both exciting and frightening at the same time (think Lovecraft)! This book attempts to speak to the philosophical and ethical issues raised by (...) space. Who owns space? Who should pay for space exploration and what is the impact on human beings on earth today? What happens if we’re not alone in the universe? What is the value and meaning of space exploration? What are the ethical implications of AI and Technology in relation to space exploration (what if they get away from us?!)? Questions! Questions! Questions! The Call for Chapters for this book Space, Philosophy and Ethics read: “For space science people, this conference is a platform to discuss the subconscious philosophical and ethical implications of their research that have been in the back of their minds while researching. For philosophers and non-specialists, it is an opportunity to learn together and struggle to find solutions for the philosophical and ethical quandaries that space science, exploration and technology present to humanity”. The approaches to space seem endless. Physics, as Aristotle discovered, inevitably leads to metaphysics, and metaphysics always have ethical concerns. The book loosely follows this outline. It begins and ends with the metaphysical implications of space, the spiritual, if you will. It leads with poetry. That seems appropriate since while we may ask many questions regarding space, we are likely to find very few answers. Then the book briefly looks at the ethical implications of AI and Technology for space exploration. There are chapters that deal with the material ethics of space commerce and ontology. Telos and Axiology (Value) are also explored. This book hopes to facilitate human struggle with the ethical implications of space rather than presuming to solve all its problems. (shrink)

A careful reading of Harvey C. Mansfield's Manlines s and the recent translation of Daniel Tanguay's Leo Strauss; une biographie intellectuelle reveals that neither text supports the view that Leo Strauss was a harmless if qualified friend of liberal democracy. Key Words: Leo Strauss • Straussians • Nietzsche • Carl Schmitt • Heidegger • National Socialism • Liberalism • Redlichkeit • Hobbes • Hegel • Viktor Trivas.

In suggesting that its last chapter’s purpose is to provoke the reader to begin reconsidering and thus rereading the book they have just read, this article attempts to negotiate the interpretive quarrel as whether Xenophon’s Cyropaedia deserves a “sunny” reading—in which Cyrus straightforwardly embodies Xenophon’s own political ideals—or a more critical “dark” one, that separates the author from his protagonist. To help us get the most advantage from the paideia his book was intended to provide, Xenophon made a “sunny” first (...) reading plausible, but he also sowed in his text the kind of clues—especially with respect to pleonexia—that would reveal his full intentions only to those who reread his book. (shrink)

The question to which I should like to address my remarks asks, as I understand it, whether philosophical knowledge can attain a truth which is not merely independent of individual men but of human nature and the human situation in general. To attempt to say anything decisive about the nature of philosophical knowledge in a few pages would be to court disaster. The most one might hope to do is to make some suggestions, and it is as suggestions that I (...) would like to offer the reflections which follow. Yet even the most tentative exploration of a philosophical problem cannot avoid prejudicing somewhat the issues it proposes to investigate, for every question determines to some extent what will count as an acceptable answer. I should, therefore, like to indicate at the outset the context of meaning in which my remarks are intended to be read. To me the question, “Is philosophy transcendental?” has a definite Kantian ring, and it is within the universe of discourse constituted by the critical philosophy that I should like to begin my discussion. (shrink)

In Philosophical Review, October 1974, Professor Jones argues that Aristotle's concept of matter is that of any individual item, such as a piece of bronze or a seed, with which a process of coming into existence begins, and which is prior (in a purely temporal sense) to the product which comes to exist. Aristotle does not try to prove the existence of some sort of "super-stuff" called "prime matter."I argue that Jones' account does not do full justice to Aristotle's analysis (...) of change, or to the traditional notion of prime matter based on it. I criticize Jones' arguments and draw attention to a passage in which Aristotle says that matter comes to be and ceases to be in one sense, while in another it does not. "Matter" in the first sense refers to the determinate individual, the first term of a change; in the second sense it is the "stuff" which remains after a substantial change, the "prime matter.". (shrink)

Joachim Schulte’s introduction provides a distinctive and masterful account of the full range of Wittgenstein’s thought. It is concise but not compressed, substantive but not overloaded with developmental or technical detail, informed by the latest scholarship but not pedantic. Beginners will find it accessible and seasoned students of Wittgenstein will appreciate it for the illuminating overview it provides.

To fit the magnificence of this setting in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People, and the honor of giving the 2007 Sir John Crawford Memorial Lecture, it is well to have a subject of suitable proportions. I have chosen one of global size and urgent time frame: our climate crisis. We only have one future and one global climate–and now it looks as if we only have one chance to rescue our civilization from collapse and prevent a mass extinction of (...) species during the 21st century. Unless you have been keeping up with climate science for the past twenty-five years, you likely do not know how serious the matter has become. The notion that we might slowly get into serious trouble by mid-century has been conveyed by the media and understood by at least some political leaders. But that scenario depends on somehow avoiding sudden shifts in climate in the meantime, instant setbacks at a time when we lack maneuvering room. An abrupt shift in drought area occurred in 1983 and we had a near-miss of a mass extinction of Amazon species in 1999. It is easy to appreciate that one more degree of global warming will seriously reduce crop yields in the tropics, but in the words of climate scientist Claudia Tebaldi 1, “It’s the extremes, not the averages, that cause the most damage to.. (shrink)